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Informality and the Development and
Demolition of Urban Villages in the
Chinese Peri-urban Area
Fulong Wu, Fangzhu Zhang and Chris Webster
[Paper first received, February 2011; in final form, August 2012]
Abstract
The fate of Chinese urban villages (chengzhongcun) has recently attracted both
research and policy attention. Two important unaddressed questions are: what are
the sources of informality in otherwise orderly Chinese cities; and, will village rede-
velopment policy eliminate informality in the Chinese city? Reflecting on the long-
established study of informal settlements and recent research on informality, it is
argued that the informality in China has been created by the dual urban–rural land
market and land management system and by an underprovision of migrant housing.
The redevelopment of chengzhongcun is an attempt to eliminate this informality and
to create more governable spaces through formal land development; but since it fails
to tackle the root demand for unregulated living and working space, village redeve-
lopment only leads to the replication of informality in more remote rural villages, in
other urban neighbourhoods and, to some extent, in the redeveloped
neighbourhoods.
1. Introduction
China has experienced rapid urbanisation in
the past three decades, its urbanisation level
increasing from about 19 per cent in 1979 to
46.6 per cent in 2008 (CNSB, 2009). Rural
to urban migration is mainly concentrated
in the eastern coastal area (Fan, 2008),
especially in the peri-urban areas of large
metropolises (Wu, 2002; Wang et al., 2010).
To what extent can the development of
Chinese cities be understood with reference
to the global South (Roy and AlSayyad,
2004), especially the notion of the ‘planet of
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slums’ attributed to a world of globalising
capitalism (Davis, 2006)?
Despite extensive studies of China’s rural
to urban migration, only recently have
there been substantial published accounts
of the habitat of migrants (Tian, 2008;
Wang et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2010). Earlier
studies of migrants largely focused on their
social structure and their exclusion from
the labour market (Solinger, 1999; Zhang,
2001) rather than their living spaces. From
studies of migrant housing, we know that
rural migrants tend to live in peri-urban
locations due to a shortage of private rental
space inside Chinese cities (Wang et al
2010; Wu, 2002). In some cities such as
Shanghai, the distribution of rural migrants
is more dispersed, including to old munici-
pal and work-unit housing areas, while in
others such as Guangzhou and Shenzhen
they are concentrated in chengzhongcun, the
so-called villages in the city (Tian, 2008).
The purpose of this paper is to use the
perspective of recent informality research
to trace the source of informality in the
context of Chinese cities and critically
examine recent policies of village demoli-
tion in China. This study aims to compare
urban informality in different Chinese cities
as well as with other countries and hence
challenge the official discourse of informal
and disorderly villages which it is deemed
necessary to demolish. The research is
centred upon the understanding that
informality is created by the political eco-
nomic institution that defines the develop-
ment process and management of informal
settlements. In the following section, the
literature of informal settlements and
informality is reviewed. Section 3 then pro-
poses a framework for analysing informality
in human settlements. Section 4 explains
the persistence of informality after land
acquisition. Section 5 examines in detail
three cases of village redevelopment. The
paper concludes by critically considering
implications for informality research in
China and elsewhere.
2. Property Rights, ‘Informality’ and
‘Informal Settlements’
There has been extensive research on infor-
mal settlements in the field of development
studies over many years (Gilbert and Ward,
1985; Gilbert, 2007; Gilbert and Gugler,
1992; UN-Habitat, 2003; Varley, 2002; van
Gelder, 2009). There is particularly good
coverage of Latin American (Gilbert and
Ward, 1985), South Asian (Nijman, 2010),
Hong Kong (Smart, 2006) and African cities
(Huchzermeyer, 2003). At the heart of the
notion of the ‘informality’ of settlements is
the issue of property rights over land inhab-
ited by the poor and low incomed. The liter-
ature exposes tremendous diversity within
the category of informal housing (also see
Payne, 2004 for a comparative discussion).
While ‘squatter settlements’ usually mean
that housing development and occupation
have occurred without the formal consent
of the landowner, other rights over the
squatted land or building might be legal. In
their study of three Latin American cities,
Gilbert and Ward emphasise the diversity
across Valencia, Bogota and Mexico City,
for example. They found that
the poor acquire land principally through
illegal processes but the form of this illegality
varies considerably between settlements and
between cities (Gilbert and Ward, 1985, p.
127).
In Valencia, it has been invasions of public
and private land that have created informal
settlements; while in Bogota, informal
neighbourhoods have been widely built on
‘pirate sub-divisions’ of legally acquired
land owned by rural e´lites and let or sold to
migrants outside the formal development
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process. In Mexico City, illegal sub-division
has been the major form of informal neigh-
bourhood expansion; but for short periods
there have been land invasions. The first
distinction to make, therefore, in under-
standing the idea of settlement informality,
is between the legality of land development
and legality of ownership. This proves to be
crucial, as we shall show, in understanding
China’s version of the informal settlement,
since the extent of self-built multistorey
‘illegal’ development in the chengzhongcun
of southern China suggests a high degree of
contractual security (Zhao and Webster,
2011). We suggest that it is the relative
strength of sanctions in different legal
domains that determines the nature of a
country’s informal settlements. Weak
development control laws and strong
formal or customary laws of contract may
be consistent with an efficient ‘informal’
land market.
The legal domains governing the emer-
gence of informal settlements go beyond the
laws governing primary land development
and exchange of newly built property, how-
ever. Property rights over land are divisible
and tend to fragment as land values increase
(Webster and Lai, 2003). An agricultural
field under single ownership may be sold
and sub-divided into multiple house plots
and any one of these plots sub-divided again
into a 10-floor building—as is typical in the
chengzhongcun of Guangdong province, for
example (Zhao and Webster, 2011). What
ultimately defines an ‘informal’ settlement
when property rights are viewed, in this way,
as separable rights over a property’s multiple
attributes? The answer is that the definition
should be purpose-specific. If the issue at
stake is sub-standard and undersupplied
infrastructure, then we should be interested
in settlements built without land develop-
ment and building control permits. If the
issue is space and public health of tenants,
then the interest will be in rental markets
operating outside public health and rental
laws. If the problem is lack of capital, the
focus might be on legal title.
One of the problems with the studies of
informal housing in the past has been the
lack of nuance in this respect and the appli-
cation of overgeneralised diagnosis and pre-
scription and confused debate. Kiddle
(2010) notes two seminal authors (Turner
and de Soto) who have shaped this debate,
both of whom make certain assumptions
about the efficiency of existing property
rights allocations in informal settlements.
Based on fieldwork in Peru, Turner (1976)
argued that squatter settlements provided
‘self-help housing’ to the poor who cannot
afford formal housing. Depending upon
informal labour markets, the poor cannot
afford to travel long distances and have to
live near their informal jobs to reduce
transport costs and time. Turner’s emphasis
on the positive function of squatter housing
led to a widespread reversal of earlier poli-
cies of demolition and slum resettlement,
which were widely replaced in the 1970s
and 1980s with in situ squatter upgrading
(Pugh, 2000).
Hernando de Soto (2000) argued that
the poor in the developing world possess
valuable assets that cannot be transacted
because of the lack of legal property rights.
He insisted that an absence of legally pro-
tected private property hinders capital for-
mation among the poor because it reduces
an incentive to save and invest and lowers
access to borrowing. The policy implication
of his research is advocacy of the legalisa-
tion of land titles through land titling
programmes—an approach supported by
the World Bank (van Gelder, 2009; Mooya
and Cloete, 2007).
De Soto’s analysis and message have been
criticised on various grounds. In developing
countries, land sales are common without
formal title (Gilbert, 2002); and there are
social practices that recognise de facto
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property rights, sometimes rendering ‘infor-
mal’ agreements stronger than those made
under formal laws (Varley, 2002; Musembi,
2007). Gonzalez (2009) criticises de Soto’s
tenure regularisation as a panacea, noting
that it has been used by liberal governments
as a way of avoiding problems that cannot
be solved by tenure policy. Varley (2002)
warns that incorporating informal housing
into the formal market can disrupt commu-
nity life and lead to forced relocation
through gentrification.
Many of the problems addressed in such
debates are resolved by understanding the
divisible nature of property rights. As we
have said, property rights over a resource
may be divided between multiple owners,
the fragmentation being limited only by the
technical and legal possibility of creating
exclusive ownership and the existence of
specialists with the appropriate knowledge
to assume ownership of a specialised right.
De Soto’s leverage point, at a technical level,
is incontrovertible: if the tenure system is
adjusted so that the freehold or leasehold
right to a poor family’s abode can be tempo-
rarily separated from the right of abode and
transferred to a bank or other owner of capi-
tal, then that family is likely to have greater
access to capital. This is not necessarily a
panacea for all ills in informal settlements
but it may, under certain conditions, con-
tribute to creating wealth among the poor.
In other conditions, it may lead to gentrifi-
cation with or without windfall gains to the
poor who vacate an attractive location to
make way for the more wealthy. Windfall
gains are significant in China, through its
own version of tenure regularisation which,
as we explain, involves the acquisition of
formal property rights through compensa-
tion apartments after the informal property
is demolished. However, the gains fall only
to the informal landlords, not to the dis-
placed migrant renters—which creates a
serious problem of shrinkage in the supply
of low-cost homes.
Payne (2004) makes the point that leg-
ally separable rights to collateralised prop-
erty are neither sufficient nor necessary for
home investment in poor neighbourhoods:
perceived tenure security is also an impor-
tant factor. Van Gelder (2009) finds that
tenure legality and perceived tenure secu-
rity are closely related and that both can
enhance housing improvement, but
through different mechanisms. One conse-
quence of recognising the separate effects of
legal and perceived tenure security in the
spontaneous upgrading of poor neighbour-
hoods is to widen the idea of informality.
Informality is not a binary categorisation
(formal/informal): there are levels and
degrees of informality. This is closely linked
to the law and property rights theorists’
Alchian and Demsetz’ (1973) seminal idea
that a property right, in essence, is not a
binary assignment (right/no right); in prac-
tice, rights are held in degrees and the level
of right depends not only (or not at all in
some cases) on legal writ, but most impor-
tantly on the power to enforce. If this is
true, then because property rights are infi-
nitely divisible and always therefore incom-
pletely assigned (there is always some other
attribute of land that can be partitioned
and transferred to another owner), all land
everywhere and all structures on it are to
some degree subject to informal use. Even
in a city as well established and organised
as Milan, Italy, neo-classical building
facxades become the informal canvas for
graffiti artists. The purchaser of an apart-
ment located in the catchment area of a
good state school in a Chinese city may
well pay a price premium of tens of thou-
sands of yuan compared with a similar
apartment outside the catchment. This is
payment for an informal right to educa-
tional public goods: informal in the sense
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that the right is protected neither by plan-
ning or educational law nor by the private
contract law by which rights to the apart-
ment were acquired. The valuable ‘educa-
tional-access’ attribute of the property
could be taken away without compensation
but the informality of the right does not
stop the housing market functioning as a
surrogate education market. This is as true
in European, American and African cities
as Chinese cities, demonstrating the generic
and ubiquitous nature of informality in
cities of all kinds.
3. Sources of Informality in China’s
Urban Villages
We suggest that there are four important
sources of property rights ambiguity and
therefore informality in China’s urban
villages.
3.1 Dualistic and Fragmented
Landownership
Rural land is collectively owned, while
urban land is state owned. The land use
rights of urban land can be leased to develo-
pers through the competitive land market.
Urban villages are created by the disjuncture
of the dual land use system. The municipal-
ity, as the owner of state land, monopolises
the supply of leased land in the primary
land market. During rapid urban expansion,
former rural villages have been encircled by
expanding urban built-up areas, becoming
literally ‘villages in the city’. According to
the 1988 Land Administration Law, updated
in 1998, compensation for land acquisition
consists of compensation for land, reloca-
tion cost and property compensation. Land
compensation is calculated as six to ten
times the average annual output of the
farmland in the previous three years and
relocation compensation is based on the
size of the affected household (Tian, 2008;
Zhao and Webster, 2011). To save costs in
land acquisition, the original site of a village
may not be acquired by state development
projects and thus remains in collective own-
ership, while the village agricultural land is
transferred into state ownership. This pro-
cess of land acquisition forms the juxta-
posed dual landownerships in peri-urban
areas. Rights over village property are
ambiguous from two points of view. First,
village land tends to be allocated by a mix-
ture of administrative fiat (by the village
committee) and quasi market mechanisms
(through supplementing administrative
allocation rules with price for premium
sites, for example, and then through subse-
quent trading—for example, one villager
amassing land by buying up other villagers’
plots). Secondly, under Chinese land law,
the land may not legally be freely transacted
in the land market. Village land is inalien-
able outside the village, but this has not pre-
vented a buoyant black market in so-called
small property rights homes. These are sold
under the protection of contracts, but they
are not strictly legal.
3.2 Lax Land Management and
Development Control
The formal management and development
control required by urban plans only covers
state-owned land. Rural farming households
have been able to build and extend their
houses with minimal formal development
control. In rural areas, land for housing is
initially allocated to farming households
according to family size. On these land plots,
farmers can build relatively freely within
space limits. Since 1989, however, many
places have stopped allocating land for hous-
ing because of the shortage of land. This
inevitably led to a densification of the histor-
ical village housing plots. Villagers’ com-
mittees in densely populated peri-urban
areas have therefore allowed farmers to
INFORMALITY AND VILLAGE CHANGE IN CHINA 1923
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extend their houses upwards and where pos-
sible outwards when their children get mar-
ried and need more space. The bigger driver
for village densification, however, has been
building upwards to maximise rental floor
space. Peri-urban villagers surrounded by
farmland converted by the state into urban
uses, find themselves in possession of prime
land for migrant worker rental and respond
rationally by maximising the yield of their
inalienable assets. Self-built high density is
thus the norm rather than exception in rural
areas. Village housing redevelopment is not
illegal if the overall housing space is within
the specified limit (the normal limit is set as
the standard farmers’ housing of ‘two floors
and a half [loft space]’ with a space of 240–
280 square metres, depending on province).
However, left outside the regime of formal
development control, rental housing is con-
structed by individual landlords at much
higher densities than this, working as small
developer-owners without formal residen-
tial land use plans. Each household tries to
maximise the use of its assigned housing
plot, building up to the boundary and leav-
ing medieval-style narrow gaps between
buildings. Urban villages are thus charac-
terised by high building coverage and it is
this plus the unregulated quality of con-
struction and lack of public goods that make
such a stark physical contrast between urban
villages and the other neighbourhoods in
Chinese cities.
3.3 Informal Service Provision and
Management
The infrastructure of these villages is very
underdeveloped. Villagers’ committees may
provide skeletal basic services such as
roads, pavements and water supply but, in
most cases, urban villages are outside the
formal provision of municipal-govern-
ment-supplied services. There is an irony in
this but also a consistent logic. The irony is
that municipal governments generate their
working revenue from the land taken from
farmers but they do not generally reinvest
any of it (beyond the set compensation
component) in upgrading village infra-
structure. The logic of this is that the
municipal state has no jurisdiction in
urban villages: it neither owns the land nor
has a responsibility for territorial govern-
ance. Village landlords do not pay tax to
the municipal government and, if they wish
to avail themselves of organised urban ser-
vices, they hire the services of property
management companies. In this sense,
urban villages are rather like an informal
and low-income version of the privately
governed commodity housing estates built
on the farmers’ former fields. The Chinese
urban governance and financing model is
much more in line with the idea of a resi-
dential club economy rather than the tradi-
tion municipal public-sector economy
(Webster and Lai, 2003). The result is an
underprovision of public goods as urban
economic theory would predict and a pro-
liferation of informal arrangements with
degrees of security of provision.
3.4 Marginal and Ambiguous Status of
Village Governance
This fourth dimension of informality is
closely related to the third. The emergence
of informal rental housing in urban villages
is a result of the constrained housing supply
facing millions of rural migrants who are
subject to severe discrimination and disad-
vantages in obtaining other kinds of hous-
ing (Song et al., 2008). This kind of rental
housing is developed under a marginalised
development process (Wu, 2004; Liu et al,
2010) because municipal governments
adopt a highly urban-biased development
approach and, as we have noted, neglect
investment in ‘leftover’ villages. The gov-
ernance of these villages has an inferior
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status because it is the preserve of villagers’
committees. In reality, it is the shareholding
companies formed to control villagers’ col-
lective assets rather than the village admin-
istrative government that takes on the
responsibility for providing basic social ser-
vices. On the one hand, the ability of village
government to adapt through incorpora-
tion is a strength and has undoubtedly con-
tributed to the dynamic nature of the urban
village economy. On the other hand, it has
created even more ambiguities in responsi-
bilities and a greater discontinuity than
might otherwise have been the case with
formal urban governance.
4. The Persistence of Informality
after Redevelopment
The informal urbanisation described, starts
in peri-urban villages before the acquisition
of farmland. In villages at distances up to 50
km or more from large cities, evidence can
be found of village-initiated urban develop-
ment on parts of village land (Webster et al,
2005). An acceleration of the processes is
triggered by farmland acquisition. The
informal urban order we have described
does not disappear through the process of
village land acquisition, however, and there
are two important specific ways in which
informality persists in the life of an urban
village.
First, compensation practices contribute
to the persistence of informality, particularly
in southern China. To reduce the monetary
cost of compensation, local governments
have typically returned a proportion of agri-
cultural land as in-kind compensation,
known as ‘economic development land’
(jingji fazhan yongdi), to villagers (Tian,
2008), transferred back to them as a collec-
tive asset to be developed into non-
agricultural income-earning uses. Property
rights over land in this part of a village
redevelopment plan are in collective owner-
ship. These lands are subject to little formal
development control. This further expands
the stock of land outside the state’s formal
development regime, which strengthens
rather than reduces informality.
A second way in which informality per-
sists is in the internal dynamic established
by a buoyant rental economy. Over time,
the growth of the rental economy in urban
villages has meant that there are hundreds of
neighbourhoods in any one large city, co-
owned by a new rentier class of villager who
has long ago abandoned the hard and dirty
work of farming in favour of the informal
urban economy. Informality has repaid
these families handsomely and villagers have
a deeply entrenched interest in finding ways
to maintain and expand their privileged
informality. One way is to resist any formal
development control by the municipal gov-
ernment over the use of their land and in
some cases to resist urban redevelopment.
The resistance is even greater from villagers
who have developed rental factories and
commercial buildings since their income
loss is typically greater than owners of resi-
dential rental property (Tian, 2008; Zhao
and Webster, 2011; Liu et al., 2010). The size
of the migrant rental economy in urban vil-
lages can be said to have helped to sustain
the informality of these parts of the Chinese
city—the informal economy providing cru-
cial income to landless farmers who would
otherwise suffer from poverty and depriva-
tion (He et al., 2009) and creating opportu-
nities for non-agricultural activities such as
low-level urban services, workshops and vil-
lage enterprises. Wang et al. (2010) observed
that, because of the practice of returning
land to farmers, urban villages have acquired
an important function in manufacturing.
Small enterprises and workshops located in
these villages, usually on collective land,
provide employment to local villagers as
well as to migrant workers. Viewed as micro
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urban economies, not just migrant dormi-
tories, it is clear that urban villages in China
play the familiar role of the informal settle-
ment in other developing countries: provid-
ing affordable housing to rural migrants, an
entry-point for people from the same origin
and a low-rent enclave within which to try
and build a productive urban life (Ma and
Xiang, 1998; Zhang, 2001; Zhang et al.,
2003; Song et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2010).
5. Three Chinese Urban Villages
In this section, we examine three urban vil-
lages respectively located in Beijing,
Shanghai and Guangzhou. The dimensions
of informality are explored, taking a com-
prehensive narrative.
5.1 Research Method
The original research presented in this paper
was conducted from May to September
2010 as part of a larger study of peri-urban
informal settlements in Chinese cities. We
conducted face-to-face semi-structured
interviews in three cities (Beijing, Shanghai
and Guangzhou). In each city, we selected
four to five villages within which to conduct
case studies and undertake a survey
(reported in other papers); we conducted 15
interviews in each city lasting from 30 min-
utes to 2 hours and collected other informa-
tion from key informants. In addition, in
Shanghai, the investigation was facilitated
by focus group meetings in local district
planning offices, in conjunction with sepa-
rate research organised by the municipal
planning bureau. For the current paper, we
choose to focus on three villages; two that
have received wide media attention
(Tangjialing in Beijing and Gaojiabang in
Shanghai) and the other, an archetypical
project for city-wide policy formulation
(Liede in Guangzhou). We collected internal
documents for village planning and
government policy through our collabora-
tors, all of whom had expert knowledge
in their respective villages through inde-
pendent academic or government-
commissioned research.
5.2 Tangjialing in Beijing: Enclave of the
‘Ant Tribe’
Tangjialing is located in the town of
Xibeiwang outside the fifth ring road of
north-west Beijing. The Zhongguancun
Science Park extended to this area in 2000
and the arrival of workers in the IT sector
stimulated a huge demand for housing. The
low-income IT workers became known
locally as the Chinese ‘ant tribe’ (yizu)
because they could not afford formal hous-
ing and lived like ‘ants’. As well as con-
structing their own rental properties,
villagers leased land to private developers
(who ‘informally’ developed residential
compounds in Beijing) to build large stan-
dard rental apartments, creating a residen-
tial compound managed commercially by
private companies. These apartments
became known as ‘student apartments’ and,
later, as ‘white-collar apartments’. This
illustrates both the persistence of informal-
ity and its trajectory towards greater form-
ality as the value of informal collective
assets rises in the face of demand. The qual-
ity of these apartments is much better than
individual self-built blocks, but the rental
activities are nevertheless still informal in
the sense that they are not recognised as a
formal business that should pay urban
taxes. Instead, apartments built on collec-
tive land contribute rental income to the
villagers’ management committees through
a ‘lease contract of land’. The contract is
upheld by contract law and formal in that
sense, but in theory it is illegal in the sense
that it contravenes the state’s property right
over the conversion of agricultural land to
urban uses.
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The rent in Tangjialing ranges from 300
yuan per month for a low-quality room of
around 10 square metres to 700 yuan per
month for a relatively better-quality 20
square metre studio with kitchen and toilet.
Surprisingly, most rental housing has an
Internet connection. Because the rental hous-
ing market is competitive, landlords are quite
innovative in improving housing conditions.
For example, in some buildings, the corridors
of the second floor upwards use transparent
panels to allow light to pass through to lower
floors. Seeing this kind of practical innova-
tion, one planning professional commented,
‘‘this is really marvellous; we could not do
this because we simply do not know what the
tenants need’’ (personal communication,
July 2010). Another example of market-
driven innovation is the provision of a small
shuttle bus by a large landlord to connect res-
idents with the bus station at the entrance of
Tangjialing. Shuttle buses are convenient for
tenants and have become a selling point for
residential compounds such as the Dongjia
Compound. Others plan to follow, one land-
lord telling us of his plan to buy a small van
(an unregulated transport service) to do the
same, which was only suspended when he
heard of the plan for demolition of nearby
compounds (personal communication, July
2010). Most tenants in Tangjialing seem sat-
isfied, as one young couple suggested to us,
when they were preparing the check-out pro-
cedure with the landlord and leaving because
of the forthcoming demolition
Could you please ask the government not to
demolish this place? We are quite happy to
live here, and now we have to find another
place and don’t know whether we might have
the same kind of customised buildings to live
(personal communication, July 2010).
The management of services, as shown in
this example, is generally informal, depend-
ing upon demand and perceived profit
opportunities. Informality thus makes for
dynamism and responsiveness to the needs
of the local market. In March 2010, the
project to redevelop Tangjialing officially
started (Figure 1). Instead of using the
words ‘demolition and relocation’ (chai
qian), the phrase now adopted in Beijing
for redevelopment is ‘vacating’ (teng tui),
implying that for landlords and local villa-
gers this means temporarily vacating the
old homes and then returning to the same
place after the project is completed.
The case shows that, although informal-
ity persists with the inbuilt dynamics we
have suggested, its trajectory, at least here,
is towards full integration with the formal
economy. This happens when property
rights are shared between the municipal
state (district or municipal level), develo-
pers and onward purchasers of land leased
by the state and the residual and formalised
institutions of village collective organisa-
tion—namely, the stock companies that
own ‘compensation land’ ceded back to vil-
lagers by the state together with other assets
won by the villagers during the redevelop-
ment negotiation process. At this point,
there is little informality left. There may be
some ambiguity in the rights allocated by
the village companies and there will almost
certainly be ambiguities in the relationships
between the residual village administrative
Figure 1. The demolition of Tangjialing.
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committees and the incorporated equiva-
lents. Yet since the village committees will
disappear and be replaced by residents’
committees under street office governance,
this is the end of the trajectory. This is a
very different trajectory from those of infor-
mal settlements in other countries. The end
game is redistribution of property rights via
a mixture of market, government and col-
lective institutions and the formalisation of
each of these in different ways.
5.3 Gaojiabang in Shanghai: A Hidden
Enclave of Informal Housing
Gaojiabang is hidden away behind a pros-
perous street in the district of Xuhui, a well-
developed central district in Shanghai. The
entrance to this village is very modest, unex-
pectedly leading to a high-density, congested
residential area of low-quality housing with
bustling narrow streets full of small shops
and stores. The registered population is 1373
individuals, but the migrant population
adds about 3000. About 20 per cent of the
1373 local residents still live there (interview,
‘street officer’, June 2010), the others having
moved out to the suburbs for better housing.
The area of Gaojiabang is about 60 mu (4
hectares).
The modern history of Gaojiabang is
associated with the rise and fall of
Shanghai’s colour TV industry. Before the
1980s, the place was at the edge of the
built-up area of the city. The village’s agri-
cultural land was acquired and later used
by the TV factory, but the factory became
bankrupt in 2009; the place was then under
the management of Caohejin ETDZ (nick-
named, ‘Cao developer’), which has never
managed to acquire the village site because
of the Shanghai government’s strict control
over the land conversion process. In
Shanghai, the municipality strictly legislates
against negotiations between developers
and villages. This has the effect, among
other things, of weakening the villagers’
bargaining position and reducing their cut
of the urban land value created by redeve-
lopment. Following the normal dynamic of
urban villages, the area experienced sponta-
neous densification over the years as land-
lords responded to a market demand for
smaller and hence cheaper units. The area
is central, well developed and very accessi-
ble for service-sector workers, so as long as
it remains un-redeveloped this piece of
residual space has a powerful niche posi-
tion for low-quality, crowded but cheap
accommodation, which is very popular
with tenants (personal communication,
landlord, August 2010).
The case suggests that the on-going
informality in this village results from a
typically complex structure of ownership
that includes a more attenuated version of
village collective right than in Beijing and
other cities. A fragmentation of administra-
tion structure at the time of development
may have exacerbated the uncoordinated
nature of self-build activities and left allo-
cation of property rights over buildings and
shared land unclear and undocumented.
The initial land transaction when the TV
factory and worker village was built had
shades of informality but appears to have
been endorsed by the state and was not, in
that sense, illegal. This is quite distinct
from the first case. There, informality was
associated with illegality and although
informality persisted with positive effects, it
came to an end because property rights
were not sufficiently ambiguous and/or
fragmented to prevent comprehensive rede-
velopment. In Gaojiabang, fragmented and
ambiguous ownership plus the lack of villa-
ger rights to negotiate a favourable collec-
tive deal with potential developers have
prevented comprehensive redevelopment.
The irony in this is that the strong state
control over the right to urban land value
increase (capping this for villagers at
1928 FULONGWU ET AL.
 at University College London on August 1, 2014usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
statutory compensation levels on the
assumption that villagers do not have any
right to development value) has the effect
of protecting the informal settlement from
redevelopment through stalemate. We
show in the third case study how the
Guangzhou government has overcome this.
5.4 Liede in Guangzhou: A Vertical Village
through Massive Redevelopment
Liede is located in the new city centre of
Guangzhou in Guangdong province. The
central location means that this village is
exceptional in terms of accessibility and
importance to the image of the city, which
is a strategic priority of the municipal gov-
ernment. It is inside the new central busi-
ness district of Guangzhou known as ‘Pearl
River New Town’. The village is a long-
established one, with a total population of
7800 people (about 3000 households) in
2010 and a migrant population of 8000 in
2008. The village occupies an area of 33.7
hectares. The total existing building floor
space is 653 000 square metres, of which
595 000 square metres (over 90 per cent)
have formally approved property certifi-
cates (internal documents for the draft plan
of the area, obtained in 2009).
The cost of redeveloping a single village
usually amounts to several billion yuan
(interview, manager of a major development
corporation in Guangzhou, September
2010), a figure that has risen consistently
over time. Faced with rising costs, the
municipal government made virtually no
progress in the redevelopment of villages in
the 1990s. The bargaining power of local vil-
lagers is strong in southern China because of
the clan network organisation that overlays
administrative (villagers’ committee), politi-
cal (local communist party) and corporate
(village stock companies) organisations. To
gain more compensation as well as rental
income, villagers extended and in some
cases comprehensively replanned and recon-
structed the residential buildings con-
structed on their housing plots. Some village
buildings are as high as 15 floors, creating
the most dense chengzhongcun in China. In
an effort to break negotiation deadlocks
facing its redevelopment programme in the
city, the municipal government conceded an
upper limit for compensated space at 280
square metres under the conditions of rede-
velopment (interview, district planner,
August 2010). In Liede, however, such was
the power of the villagers in this prominent
location that this compensation limit
restriction was relaxed (interview, municipal
land administration bureau, August 2010).
The gradual concession of a larger fraction
of urban development land value to villagers
giving up their land makes it more likely
that villagers subsequently facing redevelop-
ment will use all means at their disposal
(popular protest, political connections,
patronage and legal challenge) to hold out
for a better compensation deal and the pro-
cess is thus self-reinforcing.
In the new phase of redevelopment start-
ing in 2008, there has been no uniform city-
wide policy. Instead, individual villages
negotiate with the municipal government
under the ‘one village, one policy’ (yi cun y
ice). What is unique in Liede’s redevelop-
ment package is that villagers were fully
compensated according to a 1:1 compensa-
tion ratio—i.e. compensated space is equiv-
alent to full-property rights space
demolished. Even for non-certified floor
space, however, villagers were given 10 per
cent of the floor space in compensation.
This greatly smoothed the redevelopment
process and meant that some villagers
acquired as many as seven compensation
units (interview, district planner, September
2010). To do this, the municipality had to
relax its own legal density controls—which
may be viewed as another kind of informal-
ity persistence. Because of the excessively
INFORMALITY AND VILLAGE CHANGE IN CHINA 1929
 at University College London on August 1, 2014usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
high-density redeveloped collective assets,
the newly redeveloped village is nicknamed
the ‘vertical village’ (personal communica-
tion, university researcher, August 2010).
The three cases show that sources of
informality and the approach to redevelop-
ment vary across different cities. Informality
means many things and we have technically
defined it as arising from ambiguities in
rights over urban resources. The differences
we have described are reminiscent of the
diversity of informal settlements in Latin
America (Gilbert and Ward, 1985). Making
the comparison between three cities in the
same country enables us to be quite specific
about the sources and trajectories of inform-
ality which, as we suggest in our earlier dis-
cussion, reflect the relative strength of
sanctions wielded by the institutions gov-
erning the contested assets found in urban
villages.
6. Conclusion
This paper is based on an analysis of urban
villages in Beijing, Shanghai and
Guangzhou. The villages have all been the
location of widespread self-built, high-
density and low-quality housing for rural
migrants. We have identified the sources of
informality and explained why govern-
ments continue to strive to formalise rental
housing owned by former farmers. The
informality in these settlements, by which
we mean property rights ambiguities, was
sewn into the institutions of urban–rural
dualism prior to market reform and has
flourished and diversified since the intro-
duction of market mechanisms. The own-
ership and responsibility ambiguities
resulting from a dual land market, adminis-
trative land allocation within collectives,
parallel political and corporate organisa-
tions representing near-overlapping sets of
villagers, weak development control
institutions and from years of unregulated
entrepreneurialism, mean that informality
has multiplied along several interlocking
dimensions under market-led growth.
Because of the persistence of urban–rural
dualism, full alienable land title to rural
land is denied to villagers and farmers
cannot sell their land to developers. On the
other hand, the management of rural land
is more lax, partially because of the lack of
land management capacity in rural areas
and partially because of the practice of
allowing farmers to retain some land as in-
kind ‘compensation’ to save the cost of land
requisition. Farmers are allowed to change
agricultural to non-agricultural uses on this
land by self-development. Informal devel-
opment is exacerbated by complex landow-
nership created during piecemeal land
requisition and constrained by the exten-
sion of urban governance to rural areas.
Through the demolition of urban villages,
the state hopes to create more ‘governable
spaces’. This is achieved through a formal
land development process through which
village land is acquired by the local state to
lease to larger developers in the formal land
market. However, informality is not imme-
diately eradicated. On the contrary, redeve-
lopment diminishes informal-sector
housing because the formally developed
commodity housing is generally simply too
expensive for migrant workers and their
families. The informality thus allows the
poor to live on lower wages and therefore
bring down the cost of production—a phe-
nomenon well identified in the literature of
development studies.1 This thus creates a
demand for alternative informal housing
elsewhere. When urban villages are demol-
ished, some migrants are pushed further
away to other villages in the peri-urban
area. Others, who can afford to rent the vil-
lagers’ newly redeveloped properties on the
site of the former village may stay in situ in
neighbourhoods that look less like slums
1930 FULONGWU ET AL.
 at University College London on August 1, 2014usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
but nevertheless may be informal in the
sense of being governed by multiparties
with respective rights not fully delineated
(village committee, stock company, individ-
ual villagers and local government). As a
result, informality is to a degree, sustained
and transformed.
These cases also show that the detailed
processes of creating informality and of for-
malisation through redevelopment are dif-
ferent from place to place. This is contingent
upon different configurations of the relation
between the state, capital, land and villagers.
In Shanghai, the governance capacity is
stronger than in the other two cities and
hence the regime of formal development
tends to dominate in the process of village
redevelopment. However, such a formal
development approach is not able to ‘con-
quer’ a place where there is complicated
landownership and/or unfavourable devel-
opment conditions such as smaller parcels
or irregular plot shapes. Informality in
places such as Gaojiabang thus remains. In
Guangzhou, self-built and informal land
markets are more established because tradi-
tionally the role of villagers’ committees and
other rural organisations is stronger.
Recognising the power of villagers, the
municipality has taken a pragmatic
approach to compensate villagers more gen-
erously, leading to the emergence of large
redeveloped projects in these villages. In
Beijing, the state, developer and villages
jointly participate in the process of redeve-
lopment. While the compensation to villa-
gers is often better than in Shanghai, the
redevelopment process requires formalisa-
tion similar to that of Guangzhou. The
diversity of these cases shows that there is no
standard practice of village redevelopment,
as implied by the title of Guangzhou’s ‘one
village, one policy’. The difference between
the villages shows that there is tremendous
diversity in the sources and practices of
informality and the formation, destruction
and evolution of informal settlements in
China—as is the case in the rest of the world
(Gilbert and Ward, 1985; Payne, 2004; Roy
and AlSayyad, 2004). The fact that there is
such diversity in practices between these
three Chinese cities indicates the informal
practices—flexible and ambiguous applica-
tion of the law with respect to local circum-
stances. China is a good laboratory for
studying the nuanced variations of inform-
ality in cities facing different circumstances
because it has great local diversity but a
common set of strong overarching institu-
tions governing land development. In fact it
is, ironically, the strength of these institu-
tions (principal amongst which is the dual
urban–rural landownership system), that
has given rise to much of the legal ambiguity
that we have defined in this paper as
‘informality’. The reason for this is that the
dual landownership system at all points
impedes normal land market practices and
inhibits and distorts those markets. The
prize from this state of affairs is shared by all
stakeholders: the rural–urban migrant
workers who find cheap housing in the
urban villages; the enriched rentier class and
small-developer village landlords; and the
state, which benefits first, from the eco-
nomic contribution to the city provided by
the cheap labour housed in these informal
spaces and, secondly, by land value uplift
earned through redevelopment. The domi-
nance of the beautification and modernisa-
tion narrative in discussions about urban
village redevelopment is rarely balanced
with a discussion of the opportunity cost to
the local economy of removing the main
source of low-cost homes. Pragmatically,
policy-makers probably simply assume and
accept that their attempt to eradicate infor-
mal spaces will push the informality further
out to the urban fringes, to newly engulfed
urban villages, which can be dealt with later.
There is a typically Chinese logic to this,
which may well work. If city-wide
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programmes to redevelop urban villages are
too successful, however, it is likely that the
first prize will fall to villagers and their
developer partners (i.e. the owners of land
and capital). Migrants will lose out by not
having access to jobs and the urban econ-
omy will eventually lose out through a
smaller and poorer-quality low-skilled
labour force. Of course, some cities might
try to eradicate informal settlements for
strategic economic reasons. Shenzhen, for
example, demolished low-cost homes in
2005 precisely to drive rural migrant work-
ers away to help shift the economy towards
higher value-added manufacturing and ser-
vices (personal communication, Shenzhen’s
deputy director of housing bureau, 2005).
The informality in Chinese cities is thus pur-
posely permitted as an economic develop-
ment approach (through the variance and
flexible execution of formal regulation and
law) and also constrained for the sake of
governance (see Roy, 2009, for ‘informality
as exception’).
Note
1. We would like to thank an anonymous
referee for reminding us of this point.
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